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    12 June

    Change in Control Provisions

     
    Change-in-Control Arrangements
     
    An executive employment contract that provides the executive with a lucrative severance package in the event of termination. May include a continuation of salary, bonus and/or certain benefits and perquisites, as well as accelerated vesting of stock incentives and/or certain retirement benefits.
    Topic areas: Governance
     
    Change-in-Control Provisions
     
    Provisions in executive compensation plans that allow participants to cash out options or accelerate benefits in the event of a change in control. The provisions may be explicitly written into a plan when it is adopted, or may simply give the board or compensation committee broad discretion to adjust awards when faced with a change in control. Some executive severance agreements provide payments in the event of the executive's departure regardless of the reason. The Internal Revenue Code considers such payments excessive if they exceed 2.99 times an executive's average annual compensation package.  See also:Golden Parachute
    Topic areas: Governance
     
    Debt change-of-control provisions: a pseudo poison pill?
     
    International Financial Law Review (December 2001)
     
    In alleged response to an insider bid by 30% shareholder CAIH in the recent contest for control of Hurricane Hydrocarbons, the Hurricane board declared a special dividend payable by way of senior unsecured notes. A controversy arose because the notes contained a change-of-control provision that would be triggered by the acquisition of more than 50% of the Hurricane shares. Upon a change-of-control, the holders of the notes could elect to have the notes redeemed. The net effect was a potential cash depletion of $200 million from Hurricane's cash flow.

    CAIH applied to the Securities Commissions, claiming that the notes were intended to prevent the Hurricane shareholders from exercising their fundamental rights to consider and accept CAIH's bid. CAIH claimed that the notes were a pseudo poison pill implemented without shareholder approval to supplement the shareholder rights plan previously approved by Hurricane's shareholders. Hurricane responded by claiming that the notes were part of a preconceived strategy to reduce "overcapitalization", that the change-of-control provision was standard for debt instruments and that the market's favourable reaction was evidence of its acceptability. Hurricane further argued that the distribution of the notes did not bear the hallmark of a poison pill - a recapitalization resulting in such an increase to Hurricane's leverage that it would make Hurricane an unattractive acquisition target.

    Staff at the Commissions advised that they would not support a cease trade order of the notes if shareholder approval was obtained before the change-of-control provision imbedded in the notes took effect. It would appear that staff took the view that the provision, like a tactical poison pill put in place after a bid is initiated, was in the nature of a defensive mechanism that required shareholder approval. Not unexpectedly, Hurricane shareholders voted overwhelmingly to approve the change-of-control provision in the notes and the notes were subsequently distributed. In the meantime, CAIH withdrew its offer.

    Hurricane's distribution of the notes is a poignant example of using a special dividend to ward off an unsolicited bid when the target believes the bid is under-priced. The strategy underlying such dividends is obviously to reduce the ability of a bidder to "bootstrap" the acquisition by using the target's assets to buy the target and thereby discourage a potential offeror from making an opportunistic bid for a cash-rich target.

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